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ABSTRACT 
 Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist 
deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events 
whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a 
deontological constraint. Some deontologists simply bite the bullet, accept this 
implication of their theory, and give their best arguments as to why it does not undermine 
absolutism. Others, I think more plausibly, opt for an alternative deontological theory 
known as ‘moderate deontology’ and are thereby able to evade the criticism since 
moderate deontology permits violations of constraints under certain extreme 
circumstances. The goal of this thesis is to provide a defense of moderate deontology 
against three worries about the view, namely, that it is more accurately interpreted as a 
kind of pluralism than as a deontology, that there is no non-arbitrary way of setting 
thresholds for deontological constraints, and that the positing of thresholds for constraints 
would lead to some problematic results in practice. I will respond to each of these worries 
in turn. In particular, I will argue that moderate deontology is properly understood as a 
deontological theory despite its partial concern for consequentialist considerations, that 
thresholds for deontological constraints can be successfully located without arbitrariness 
by democratic appeal to people’s commonsense moral intuitions, and that the alleged 
problematic results of positing thresholds for constraints can be effectively explained 
away by the moderate deontologist. 
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DEONTOLOGISTS CAN BE MODERATE 
Moderate deontology, the view that deontological constraints can be permissibly 
violated when and only when doing so prevents the occurrence of sufficiently bad 
consequences, has become a popular alternative to absolutist forms of deontology, which 
hold that deontological constraints can never be permissibly violated.1 It is a view that 
many find plausible because it accommodates commonsense deontological constraints, 
but it also permits commonsense violations of those constraints whenever very much is at 
stake (e.g. it permits one murder whenever committing a murder would prevent one 
million comparable murders). Considering the abundance of moderate deontologists, one 
would suspect that moderate deontology is probably a coherent, deontological position. 
However, with respect to its being a deontological position at all, Saul Smilansky (2003) 
maintains that the view is actually pluralist, not deontological, and that we should 
understand deontology only in its typical absolutist form. 
My first objective in this thesis will be to show that, contra Smilansky, moderate 
deontology is properly understood as a deontological theory, and I hope to accomplish 
some conceptual clarification in the process regarding certain aspects of the theory. In 
particular, I will emphasize the primacy of deontological constraints in moderate 
deontology, discuss the normative implications of permissible constraints violations, and 
conclude with a succinct explanation of a point on which I partly agree with Smilansky 
concerning the significance of terminology in our normative theorizing. 
 
                                                        
1 Moderate deontology is sometimes, perhaps more frequently, called ‘threshold deontology’ for 
its positing of a threshold (or thresholds) of bad consequences beyond which, as consequences get 
worse, deontological constraints can be permissibly violated to prevent the bad consequences. 
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Smilansky 
I will begin by briefly summarizing Smilansky’s argument. Here is a quotation, 
which captures the crux of his view: 
When a person combines consequentialist and (constraint-related) deontological 
elements in her thought, Kagan classifies her as a deontologist. The very existence 
of some deontological constraints suffices to make one a deontologist. But a 
person holding a ‘half-and-half’ position incorporating consequentialism and 
deontology, with the first sort of concern sometimes trumping the second and the 
second sometimes trumping the first, should not be called a deontologist, 
moderate or otherwise. The proper description of such a person is that she is a 
pluralist, plausibly combining concern for consequences with concern for 
deontological constraints. We should retain our understanding of the 
deontological element as pure and absolute, as far as it goes. Where it does not go 
(say, beyond a threshold), it does not somehow remain ‘deontology’ while going 
for the consequentialist considerations, but rather becomes consequentialist.2 
 
The contention here is that the moderate deontologist considers both deontological 
constraints and consequences of actions to be morally relevant such that either kind of 
consideration can affect the normative status of an action, and so her position is not really 
a deontological one, but a pluralist one. Smilansky seems to think that we should reserve 
the term ‘deontology’ only for absolutist forms of deontology because those theories are 
purely deontological to the extent that they treat deontological constraints as inviolable. 
This is not to say that the absolutist must be indifferent to consequences (she can approve 
of actions that make the world a better place), but she must condemn those actions that 
violate constraints for the sake of consequences, something the moderate deontologist 
will not always do. Moderate deontology, on his understanding of it, is half-deontological 
and half-consequentialist, so pluralist. 
                                                        
2 Smilansky (2003), p. 72. Smilansky is referring to Shelly Kagan’s (1998) characterization of 
moderate deontology (p. 79.).  
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 Smilansky offers an example of a conflict between a deontological constraint and 
consequentialist concern to help clarify the issue. Suppose that the only way to prevent 
terrorists from destroying a major city is to punish an innocent person. Here a 
deontological constraint against punishing the innocent conflicts with a consequentialist 
concern about the fate of a major city. Smilansky asserts that if we opt for unjust 
punishment, which the moderate deontologist would likely recommend, then we might be 
making the right decision, but it cannot be that we are making that decision as 
deontologists. Punishing the innocent, he says, is a “paradigm of injustice” and a 
“deontologist, qua deontologist, must oppose such a plan.”3 
 Smilansky worries that combining deontological and consequentialist 
considerations into one theory and dubbing it ‘moderate deontology’ risks not 
understanding the “pluralist predicament of normative ethics”, and it allows 
commonsense morality to be mischaracterized as deontological when, in reality, it is very 
much pluralist.4 Although it may seem that the worry is merely a terminological one, 
according to Smilansky, terminology matters here. Describing moderate deontology as a 
deontological theory is simply incorrect owing to its theoretical commitments. He 
concludes that we should understand deontology only in its familiar absolutist way 
because doing so will allow us to see moderate deontology for what it really is, a kind of 
pluralism. 
 
 
                                                        
3 Smilansky (2003), p. 73. 
 
4 Ibid. p. 75. 
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Primacy of Deontological Constraints 
Now that Smilansky’s position has been presented I will argue that moderate 
deontology is suitably interpreted as a deontological theory despite its regard for 
consequentialist considerations.5 First, the primacy of deontological constraints in 
moderate deontology will be examined. Recall that Smilansky describes the theory as 
“half-and-half” because it incorporates both deontological and consequentialist concerns 
to the extent that either type of concern may trump the other depending on the situation 
(i.e. depending on whether or not a threshold of bad consequences is surpassed). While it 
is true that one type of concern may sometimes trump the other, I contend, it does not 
follow that the theory is by any means half-and-half. Smilansky understates the functions 
that deontological constraints serve in moderate deontology, and consequently he 
misrepresents the view as half-and-half. 
According to moderate deontology, typically constraints should not be violated 
because deontological constraints are much weightier than consequentialist 
considerations. In fact, it has been noted that the view is regularly interpreted to posit 
such a high threshold of bad consequences that it would frequently (almost always, I 
suggest) recommend the same action as an absolutist deontology would.6 For example, in 
                                                        
5 A quick clarification: by ‘consequentialist considerations’ I mean utilitarian-like considerations, 
and so these kinds of considerations conceptually exclude deontological ones. I state this to avoid 
any potential confusion about my discussion of consequentialist considerations since some 
consequentialist theories actually require that deontological matters (e.g. desert) be promoted. 
 
6 Larry Alexander and Michael Moore (Spring 2015 Edition) claim that moderate deontology is 
similar to the “prima facie duty” version of deontology but more closely mimics absolutist 
deontology in its verdicts. Also, Moore (2010) writes, “[T]here is a very high threshold of bad 
consequences that must be threatened before something as awful as torturing an innocent person 
can be justified. Almost all real-life decisions a GSS interrogator will face—and perhaps all 
decisions—will not reach that threshold of horrendous consequences justifying torture of the 
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Smilansky’s terrorist scenario it would be permissible on moderate deontological 
reasoning to punish an innocent person in order to prevent the destruction of a major city, 
but it would be impermissible to punish an innocent person to prevent the punishment of, 
say, a few other innocent persons. Of course the absolutist would prohibit punishment of 
the innocent no matter the consequences, but the important point is that there would be 
many situations in which the absolutist and moderate deontologist would actually agree 
on what the right course of action is (or, at least, agree on which action it would be wrong 
to perform), namely, any situation in which a threshold of bad consequences is not 
surpassed, and since such a threshold would presumably be set quite high, agreement 
between the two would be much more common than disagreement. So, with regard to 
action guidance, we can see that moderate deontology is much closer to absolutism than 
it is to any normative middle ground between absolutism and act-consequentialism that 
might appropriately be called ‘half-and-half’, such as one that sets constraints’ thresholds 
so low that deontological considerations win out approximately half the time and 
consequentialist considerations the other half. 
But, the primacy of deontological constraints in the theory is not simply a matter 
of frequency. That is to say, it is not a matter of how often those constraints should be 
respected and how rarely they should be broken. Instead, the primacy consists in the 
various ways in which moderate deontology emphasizes the normative importance of 
constraints, and the rarity of permissible constraints violations just follows from one of 
these ways, namely, the theory’s positing of the extreme weightiness of deontological 
considerations. That deontological constraints may occasionally be overridden by severe 
                                                                                                                                                                     
innocent. Short of such a threshold, the agent-relative view just sketched will operate as 
absolutely as absolutism in its ban on torturing the innocent” (p. 722, his emphasis). 
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consequentialist considerations does not entail that those constraints do not have great 
weight in the theory; they are just not absolute, as in the absolutist’s theory. Thus, not 
only is moderate deontology not half-and-half in terms of frequency, but it is not half-
and-half in terms of what matters morally from the perspective of the theorist. The simple 
fact that the involvement of morally disastrous consequences, such as the destruction of a 
major city, is required to override a deontological constraint is by itself enough to 
demonstrate this point.   
A threshold of bad consequences beyond which it becomes permissible to violate 
some constraint, then, must be high enough to reflect the moderate deontologist’s 
theoretical commitment to the primacy of deontological constraints. If the threshold were 
set so low that the possibility of trivially bad consequences could justify violations of 
such a constraint, then it would seem to follow that deontological constraints are not so 
critical to the moderate deontologist, and her theory might be accurately characterized as 
pluralist after all. I will not yet discuss what the exact location of a constraint’s threshold 
may be, but suffice it to say for now that because deontological constraints are given 
much more weight than consequentialist considerations, the moderate deontologist would 
have to set a threshold reasonably high. Consider, for instance, Nagel (2012): 
“[D]eliberately killing an innocent is impermissible unless it is the only way to prevent 
some very large evil (say the deaths of fifty innocent people). Call this the threshold at 
which the prohibition against murder is overridden.”7 The positing of high thresholds is a 
                                                        
7 Nagel (2012), p. 62, emphasis his. Notice that he characterizes the threshold as the decisive 
point at which a deontological constraint can be permissibly violated, which differs from my 
characterization of it as the point beyond which a constraint can be permissibly violated; this 
difference has no bearing on my argument. Also, I do not mean to suggest that Nagel is clearly a 
moderate deontologist, although the view does seem to be implicit in much of his discussion. For 
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necessary condition for a moderate deontological view to qualify as deontological. To 
deny this claim and assert that there can be low thresholds for constraints would be to 
simply admit the point to Smilansky that such a view might be better understood as a 
kind of pluralism in light of its giving substantial weight to more than one sort of 
normative concern (the lower a threshold is set, the higher the amount of weight that is 
given to consequentialist considerations).  
While it is true that the moderate deontologist’s deontological commitments must 
be much weightier than her consequentialist commitments, it might be submitted that I 
am making too much of Smilansky’s phrase “half-and-half” and that his argument does 
not rely on a half-and-half or 50:50 ratio actually obtaining with regard to the balance of 
deontological and consequentialist considerations in moderate deontology. A 70:30 or 
80:20 ratio might also be open to Smilansky’s criticism of such a view being described as 
deontological when it would be more properly described as pluralist. This is because such 
a theory would still combine deontological and consequentialist concerns together, and it 
would give some amount of weight to both kinds of concern. 
Not only do I agree with this interpretation of Smilansky’s view, but I also agree 
that a 70:30 or 80:20 ratio might be problematic for a theorist who professes deontology 
yet endorses one of these ratios regarding the weightiness of deontological to 
consequentialist considerations. Nevertheless, this should not bother the moderate 
deontologist precisely because neither these ratios nor anything close to them accurately 
represents her theory, and furthermore it is questionable whether or not Smilansky’s use 
                                                                                                                                                                     
example, he writes, “[I]t seems to me certainly right to adhere to absolutist restrictions unless the 
utilitarian considerations favoring violation are overpoweringly weighty and extremely certain” 
(Ibid. p. 56.). 
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of ‘pluralism’ in this context is a good one, a point to which I will return. Concerning the 
ratio of weightiness of deontological to consequentialist considerations, no card-carrying 
deontologist would endorse any of the aforementioned ratios. Of course there will be 
disagreement among moderate deontologists about what the correct ratio might be, but I 
have already noted that theorists like Moore and Nagel are confident that constraints’ 
thresholds must be set very high, which indicates a quite different ratio than 70:30 or 
80:20. For example, Nagel suggests that murdering one innocent person is impermissible 
unless it is the only way to prevent a very large evil, such as the deaths of at least fifty 
innocent people (‘at least’ because he considers this the threshold for the constraint 
against murder). If we take this suggestion seriously, then we get something like a 50:1 or 
100:2 ratio of weightiness of deontological to consequentialist considerations.8 
Is a 50:1 or 100:2 ratio enough to resist the charge of pluralism? I think that it 
must be, and there are further details to be discussed about deontological constraints, 
besides their extreme weightiness in comparison to consequentialist considerations, and 
some remarks to be made about philosophers’ standard applications of ‘pluralism’ to 
certain theories that give us even more reason to think that ‘pluralism’ just gets moderate 
deontology wrong. What about others who may consider themselves moderate 
deontologists yet endorse a ratio that is closer to 70:30 or 80:20? Those theorists may 
have a more difficult time defending their views as deontological ones, especially since, 
                                                        
8 Applying this ratio to other kinds of deontological constraints and consequentialist 
considerations, I presume, would get very complicated, and so I leave it to the reader to consider 
how that might go. 
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as I have claimed, the setting of high thresholds is a necessary condition for a theory to 
count as deontological.9 
Michael Moore’s (2010) analogy, which likens moderate deontology to a dam, 
provides a useful way of illustrating the primacy of deontological constraints in the 
theory (although this is not his aim with the analogy).10 Moore asks us to imagine water 
rising behind a dam that eventually reaches the threshold of the dam’s height and spills 
over. Like a dam’s threshold, the point beyond which water spills over, a threshold in 
moderate deontology serves as a marker for determining when a constraint can be 
permissibly violated because of a spillover of negative consequences. However, unlike a 
dam’s threshold, the location of which largely depends on facts about the water it is built 
to confine, the location of a deontological constraint’s threshold does not depend on some 
already known set of facts about impending consequences. Determining a constraint’s 
threshold must begin with attention to the constraint itself rather than some set of 
consequences, but let me say more about the location of a threshold first.  
It would seem that thresholds would have to either be consistently the same no 
matter the constraint in question, or the location of a threshold would have to depend on 
                                                        
9 Suppose that one endorses a theory that posits only one deontological constraint and sets an 
extremely low threshold on that constraint such that trivially bad consequences could override it, 
and further suppose that the theory is consequentialist in all other respects. According to some 
theorists, even though such a theory has only one constraint and that constraint’s weightiness in 
comparison to consequentialist considerations is very low, it is still a kind of deontology because 
of the existence of at least one deontological constraint. Both Smilansky and I object to this sort 
of philosophical thinking. Really such a theory would be more accurately characterized as 
consequentialist! 
  
10 Moore (2010), p. 723. He attributes the analogy to Joseph Raz. 
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the nature of the constraint in question.11 For example, would the threshold for 
permissible lying be different or the same as the threshold for permissible murder? Could 
I permissibly lie to save the lives of a few innocent persons, but not permissibly commit 
murder to do so? I take it that most moderate deontologists (and commonsense morality) 
will affirm that the threshold differs in relation to the constraint in question.12 Thus, the 
threshold for permissible murder is probably much higher than the threshold for 
permissible lying. That is to say, locations of thresholds vary with constraints, and this is 
certainly another way in which the primacy of deontological constraints is manifest since 
while it is true that the moderate deontologist is concerned with what sort of 
consequences it would take to override a constraint, that question can only be answered 
by first examining the constraint in question, and once the theorist makes some 
determination about the degree of stringency of a constraint, only then can she ask 
questions about when the constraint can be permissibly violated.13 
                                                        
11 Alexander and Moore (Spring 2015 Edition) call these two versions of moderate deontology 
the “simple version” and “sliding scale threshold deontology” respectively. 
  
12 For instance, Samantha Brennan (1995) writes, “I think the amount that must be at stake to 
justify killing a person is different than the amount that must be at stake to justify punching them 
in the nose. A great deal less must be at stake when the right in question is the right not to have 
one’s nose punched. This is the intuition that the more serious the right, the more that must be at 
stake before its infringement can be justified” (p. 148.). 
 
13 A question could be raised concerning how the theorist goes about determining the stringency 
of a constraint, and she might even be accused of making this kind of determination on the basis 
of consequentialist considerations. That is to say, she might be accused of determining the 
stringency of a constraint strictly in terms of severity of consequences that could override it, and 
if this allegation were true, it would certainly undermine my claims about the primacy of 
deontological constraints in moderate deontology. But, the allegation is false. As a deontologist, 
the theorist must treat the stringency of a constraint as being intrinsic to it, and not dependent on 
any consequentialist considerations, although it is true that the theorist is forced to make some 
determination (or, perhaps, estimation) regarding at what point severity of consequences would 
override the stringency of a given constraint.  
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 It might be objected that it goes the other way too for the moderate deontologist. 
Only by examining the consequences in question will she able to determine whether or 
not a constraint should be violated, and so consequences are just as fundamental to her 
evaluations of actions as deontological constraints are. In response, consequences are 
absolutely relevant to the theorist’s evaluations, but they are not fundamental in the way 
that constraints are. To see this, one must observe the difference between the treatment of 
constraints and the treatment of consequences. Constraints are the theory’s first concern, 
as they are what the theorist focuses on when it comes to setting thresholds by evaluating 
the stringency of each constraint and thereby limiting what we can permissibly do for the 
sake of consequences. In contrast, with regard to constraints’ thresholds, consequences 
are only of concern to the theorist whenever they are severe, and the locations of 
deontological constraints’ thresholds must reflect that fact. The normative function of 
consequences in moderate deontology is that of overriding constraints, and so they would 
only appropriately enter into the theorist’s evaluations of actions whenever that function 
is either realized or comes close to being realized, which, as I have noted, is rare due to 
the locations of thresholds being set quite high.14 
 A final way in which the primacy of deontological constraints in moderate 
deontology is evident has to do with our everyday moral lives. Throughout the course of 
an agent’s life, she must make decisions about which actions to perform and which to 
abstain from performing. Since moderate deontology tells us that there are constraints 
against performing certain types of actions unless sufficiently bad consequences are at 
                                                        
14 In addition to constraints’ thresholds, consequences may also have normative significance 
beyond options’ thresholds. Another normative function of consequences, then, is that of 
overriding options. For an excellent discussion of options’ thresholds and their different possible 
relations to constraints’ thresholds, see Brennan (2009). 
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stake, it is plausible that the agent who subscribes to moderate deontology is guided 
through her everyday moral life by a constant, though not always conscious, awareness of 
such constraints and that it is this awareness that generally allows her to know which 
actions are and are not permissible. Of course this is not to suggest that in every situation 
she will consciously deliberate about whether or not she should perform some action, and 
then she will generally arrive at a conclusion about what she ought to do on the basis of 
deontological considerations. This would be an extremely implausible picture of her 
moral decision-making, given what most people’s moral experiences are actually like. 
Rather, in light of the foregoing discussion about locations of thresholds, the moderate 
deontologist’s moral experience is probably such that her moral judgments about what 
she ought to do in most cases are automatically deontological and that she would only 
engage in deeper deliberation about what she ought to do in cases where a threshold is 
either exceeded or comes close to being exceeded because these are the cases in which 
deontological and consequentialist considerations conflict in a significant way.  
Now one might object that she must have an awareness of consequences too since 
they are also relevant to the normative status of actions, and this is true, but the difference 
between the two kinds of consideration with respect to the agent’s moral experience 
cannot be ignored. It cannot be reasonably asserted that an awareness of consequences is 
what guides the agent through her moral life, although such an awareness may guide her 
prudentially speaking or in certain cases in which there is no deontological constraint in 
play.15 From time to time, she may be confronted with critical situations in which she is 
                                                        
15 Regarding supererogatory actions, the agent may face situations in which there is no 
deontological constraint in play, and although she is not obligated to promote the good, she may 
still deliberate about whether or not she will do so. These are atypical situations for the agent, 
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forced to deliberate about whether or not she ought to violate a constraint to prevent some 
set of consequences, but these situations will only occur whenever the consequences are 
very bad and would require the breaking of a deontological constraint in order to be 
prevented. Any situation in which the consequences are not severe and a constraint is in 
play will likely be one in which the agent respects the constraint without paying any 
attention to the consequences of the performance of the action. This is not to say that the 
potential consequences of her actions will never be noted by her beforehand, even when 
they are nowhere close to meeting a threshold, only that they will not be concentrated on 
as part of her decision to respect a constraint. Therefore, we can see that deontological 
constraints play another central role in the theory insofar as they guide, much of the time 
automatically, the moderate deontologist through her everyday moral life. 
Deontology beyond Thresholds 
So far I have argued that the primacy of deontological constraints in moderate 
deontology is manifest in a number of different ways, and I have shown that the theory 
cannot reasonably be considered half-and-half, as suggested by Smilansky. Now I will 
discuss the nature of constraints violations that occur beyond deontological constraints’ 
thresholds, and in doing so it will be seen that moderate deontology remains 
deontological in an important sense even when it goes for consequentialist 
considerations. Here is another quotation from Smilansky: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
though, since she will not always be deliberating about promoting the good whenever doing so 
would not involve violating a constraint. An agent may be characteristically benevolent such that 
she performs supererogatory actions on a regular basis, but characteristic benevolence would not 
require constant deliberation. She would perform those actions by her very nature, and if she were 
a moderate deontologist, then she would be guided by an awareness of constraints such that she 
would not be violating constraints for reasons of benevolence.     
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We should reject the possibility of ‘moderate’ or ‘sensible’ deontologists of the 
sort Kagan, Nussbaum and many others describe: such people need to be re-
described as pluralists who, when consequentialist and deontological concerns 
conflict, are ready to make room for consequences-indifferent concern for 
deontological constraints (e.g. before the threshold) as well as for deontological-
constraints-defeating concern with consequences (e.g. beyond the threshold). 
Because they are sensible, such pluralists suspend their partial deontological 
commitments in specific cases.16   
   
There are two points that I wish to make here. The first concerns Smilansky’s assertion 
that when consequentialist and deontological considerations conflict, the theorist is ready 
to make room for both “consequences-indifferent concern” for constraints and 
“deontological-constraints-defeating concern” for consequences. 
 With regard to consequences-indifferent concern for constraints, I think that 
Moore’s dam analogy is particularly apt for explaining this. The water counts, but there is 
no damage done unless the water spills over the dam’s threshold. Analogously 
consequences count, but there is no moral wrongness in abstaining from violating a 
deontological constraint for the sake of consequences unless the consequences are so 
severe that they exceed the constraint’s threshold. So, while it is true that consequences 
always count inasmuch as they always count toward a threshold, the moderate 
deontologist need not be concerned (normatively speaking) with consequences at any 
point before a threshold is surpassed. However, with respect to deontological-constraints-
defeating concern for consequences, the moderate deontologist could plausibly maintain 
both that it would be wrong to violate a constraint at any point before the constraint’s 
threshold is surpassed and that there is some degree of moral wrongness even when a 
constraint is violated beyond its threshold, although the violation is itself permissible. In 
                                                        
16 Smilansky (2003), p. 74. Smilansky is referring to Nussbaum’s (2001) mention of “sensible 
deontologies” (p. 101.). 
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this way, moderate deontology can be said to remain deontological beyond its 
constraints’ thresholds due to its emphasis on the wrongness of violating constraints even 
when an agent permissibly does so. The difference here, then, between the moderate 
deontologist’s concern for constraints and her concern for consequences is that the former 
is always a normative concern for her insofar as constraints violations are always to some 
extent wrong, whereas the latter is a concern for her only whenever a threshold is 
surpassed. Now this is not to suggest that moral dilemmas arise whenever consequences 
are so severe that they exceed a threshold and require the breaking of a constraint to be 
prevented. The claim is not that an agent will fail morally no matter what she does in 
these situations; there is an all things considered right action for her to perform, namely, 
preventing severe consequences from occurring. However, since doing so requires a 
constraint violation, the moderate deontologist could assert that there is some intrinsic 
wrongness in violating a constraint even when doing so is instrumentally good and is the 
all things considered right action to perform because the instrumental goodness simply 
outweighs the intrinsic wrongness.17 
There is no inconsistency in the suggestion that an agent may perform the all 
things considered right action by violating a constraint in order to prevent the occurrence 
of severe consequences and that by doing so the agent is committing some degree of 
wrongdoing insofar as she is violating some constraint. For example, the all things 
considered right action in the terrorist scenario may be to punish an innocent person to 
prevent the destruction of a major city, but to the extent that an innocent person is 
                                                        
17 Accordingly, it seems that it would not be inappropriate for an agent to feel some tinge of 
regret whenever she permissibly violates a constraint or for her to make reparations for it after the 
fact. 
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punished and a deontological constraint is thereby violated, the moderate deontologist 
could assert that there is some degree of wrongdoing that consists in someone being used 
as a means to a greater good.18 Thus, the theorist could reasonably conclude that any 
violation of a constraint amounts to some intrinsic wrongdoing being performed even 
when performing the violation is the all things considered right action in light of the 
severity of some set of consequences. 
At this point one might object that there is some degree of moral wrongness 
whenever a deontological constraint competes with consequentialist considerations for 
the all things considered right action, but the constraint’s threshold is not surpassed and 
accordingly bad consequences are allowed to occur by an agent in lieu of her violating a 
constraint to prevent them. This objection is especially problematic, one might claim, 
when we consider that there will be situations in which consequences are almost severe 
enough to override a constraint, but not quite sufficient. If violating a constraint is in 
some respect wrong both before and beyond its threshold, then why not think that 
allowing the occurrence of bad consequences is in some respect wrong both before and 
beyond a threshold? 
The moderate deontologist could respond to this objection by pointing out that her 
theory is a deontological one, and so it mainly (at least, before a threshold is exceeded) 
evaluates actions only on the basis of deontological, not consequentialist, considerations 
                                                        
18 Recall that Smilansky accurately characterizes punishing the innocent as a “paradigm of 
injustice”, although he reaches the wrong conclusion when he says that a “deontologist, qua 
deontologist, must oppose such a plan” since the absolutist must always oppose it, but the 
moderate deontologist must only conditionally oppose it. However, the moderate deontologist 
(qua deontologist!) will agree that punishing the innocent is a paradigm of injustice, and so she 
could still believe that punishing the innocent is intrinsically wrong even when the constraint 
against punishing the innocent is overridden by consequentialist considerations. 
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(e.g. considerations about respecting/not violating constraints). So, this explains why it is 
not wrong in any regard whatsoever to respect deontological constraints before their 
thresholds are exceeded. Furthermore, the entire purpose of positing thresholds is to 
indicate at what point consequentialist considerations begin to have normative 
significance whenever they conflict with deontological ones. It was noted above that 
consequences always count toward thresholds, but it would only be wrong for an agent to 
allow the occurrence of severe consequences if those consequences were to exceed a 
constraint’s threshold. The reason it can be plausibly asserted by the moderate 
deontologist that a constraint violation is always to some extent wrong but allowing bad 
consequences to occur is only wrong beyond a threshold is that the theory is 
deontological at its core, and accordingly it treats all constraints violations as intrinsically 
wrong whether or not they are the all things considered right actions, whereas 
consequences only have normative significance in the theory beyond thresholds. In other 
words, constraints violations are always intrinsically wrong, although sometimes the 
intrinsic wrongness may be outweighed by instrumental goodness, but allowing bad 
consequences to occur is only wrong whenever the consequences have normative 
significance.19 
                                                        
19 It may be the case that sometimes the occurrence of consequences is wrong before a threshold, 
but only because of the action(s) that constitute(s) the consequences and not because an agent 
allows them to occur. Suppose, for instance, that an honest criminal tells you that the only way 
you can prevent him from committing the murders of two innocent people is to commit one 
murder yourself. It would be right on moderate deontological reasoning for you to abstain from 
committing one murder in order to prevent him from committing two others, and there would be 
no wrongness in you thereby allowing the other murders to occur, but there would be wrongdoing 
on the part of the criminal who commits the two murders. So, this is an instance of wrongness in 
the occurrence of consequences before a threshold, but the wrongness does not consist in the 
consequences being allowed to occur by an agent. Rather, it consists in the actions that constitute 
the consequences, which in this case are violations of a deontological constraint against murder.  
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The second point to be made concerns Smilansky’s claim that the moderate 
deontologist suspends her “partial deontological commitments” in certain situations (viz. 
any situation in which a threshold is surpassed). Smilansky is not the first to make this 
kind of assertion. Larry Alexander writes, “The threshold deontologist [(i.e. moderate 
deontologist)] would have us believe that we switch from not being resources for others 
to being resources for others when N [(i.e. a threshold)] is reached.”20 In light of the 
foregoing, though, it should be obvious that neither of these claims should bother the 
moderate deontologist because they are, at best, dubious. The theorist need not suspend 
her deontological commitments since she can plausibly maintain that violating a 
deontological constraint is always intrinsically wrong, even when the wrongness is 
counterbalanced by consequentialist considerations, and she can also retain the 
deontological presumption that persons are not resources for others while admitting that 
beyond a threshold a person might permissibly be used as a means to an end because she 
can assert that there is some intrinsic wrongness to using the person despite its being an 
all things considered right action, given the circumstances. 
Why Terminology Matters 
By clarifying both the primacy of deontological constraints in moderate 
deontology and the normative implications of permissible constraints violations I have 
sought to show that moderate deontology is fundamentally deontological. It is a 
deontology that makes some room for consequentialist considerations in its normative 
framework, but to the extent that whenever they conflict with deontological 
considerations, consequences must be sufficiently bad to override a constraint and 
                                                        
20 Alexander (2000), p. 912. 
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thereby render its violation permissible. Whether or not moderate deontologists will agree 
with every aspect of my discussion, I think that they should agree with most of it, 
especially my emphasis on the deontological component of the theory and how the theory 
can be seen to be importantly deontological in various ways. If the moderate deontologist 
reasons otherwise and does not underscore the deontology of her theory, then she might 
just fall prey to the charge of disguising a kind of pluralism in deontology’s clothing, 
which brings the discussion of this topic to its final question: why does terminology 
matter? 
Why does it matter whether the theory is called ‘moderate deontology’ or 
‘pluralism’ (of some kind)? Smilansky contends that “terminology is significant here 
since the theoretical misinterpretation masks the degree to which common-sense morality 
is radically pluralist.”21 He then goes on to point out that people generally make room for 
both kinds of considerations in their moral decision-making, and so we should retain our 
understanding of deontology as absolute in order for us to recognize this plurality. 
I agree with Smilansky that the terminology is significant and that people do 
normally make room for both deontological and consequentialist considerations, but our 
agreement ends there. Concerning terminology, I reach the opposite conclusion. I 
maintain that if moderate deontology were re-described as a kind of pluralism, then this 
would mask the degree to which commonsense morality is radically deontological and 
opposed to consequentialist justifications of deontological wrongdoing. Of course this is 
to assume that moderate deontology represents the morality of common sense, which I 
am ready to accept, but even if there is disagreement on this point it must still be admitted 
                                                        
21 Smilansky (2003), p. 75. 
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that calling moderate deontology ‘pluralism’ would be inappropriate, given the extent to 
which the theory is deontological. ‘Moderate deontology’ is a perfectly suitable name for 
a deontological theory that is moderate in its treatment of the violability of deontological 
constraints.22 In the same way, ‘absolutist deontology’ is a fitting name for a 
deontological theory that is absolutist in its treatment of constraints. And ‘deontology’ is 
just a name for a theory or family of theories that has primarily deontological elements 
(e.g. constraints, duties, rights). There is no need to revise our terminology since 
‘moderate deontology’ captures both the fact that the theory is, at its core, a deontological 
theory and that the theory is moderate or non-absolutist. 
In general, accurate terminology is critical to our normative theorizing because 
labeling theories in certain ways distinguishes them as having certain qualities and 
belonging to certain classes of normative theories. So, there might be a further question 
about whether moderate deontology properly belongs to the set of deontological theories 
(although it obviously does on my definition of ‘deontology’). Why should a theory that 
allows consequentialist considerations to sometimes affect the normative status of actions 
be considered a deontology? I believe that I have adequately answered this question 
already in the previous two sections, and I have nothing more to add on the matter. 
However, a more troubling question might be put: why should a theory that posits more 
than one kind of normative consideration not be considered pluralist?  
The term ‘pluralism’ in philosophy is normally used to signify the existence or 
validity of more than one x, where x can be substituted with whatever the pluralist theory 
concerns. For example, value pluralism says that there exists more than one kind of 
                                                        
22 Because the theory is sometimes called ‘threshold deontology’, it could also be submitted that 
such a name is appropriate since it is a deontology that sets thresholds for its constraints. 
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irreducible value. It is this sort of routine philosophical thinking that seems to lend 
credence to the argument against moderate deontology being considered a deontological 
theory and for its being re-described as a kind of pluralism. One might argue that even if 
the position is not half-and-half with regard to action guidance or the weight of what 
matters, it is still half-and-half inasmuch as it treats two types of consideration as ones 
that can affect the normative status of actions. Thus, because it treats more than one type 
of consideration as having an impact on the normative status of actions, the theory is 
pluralist, not deontological. 
First, while it is true that moderate deontology does make room for both 
deontological and consequentialist concerns, as I have done throughout the course of this 
discussion, I will only emphasize that the deontological component is primary and that 
close inspection of the theory reveals that this is so in a number of different ways. To the 
philosopher that clings to a strict definition of ‘pluralism’, such that any theory that posits 
more than one kind of thing is itself a type of pluralism, my only response is that such a 
definition is broadly applicable to many philosophical (and not just ethical) theories. 
Therefore, it might be better applied to theories that stress the primacy and/or 
fundamentality of more than one thing, but this is merely a suggestion. 
Secondly, from the perspective of the moderate deontologist who is committed to 
the notion that morality is, at bottom, deontological, it is difficult to imagine that the 
theorist would find such a re-describing of her theory attractive. Certainly her finding the 
re-description unattractive would not itself be evidence that the theory should not be re-
described as pluralist, but given that the deontological features of her theory are so 
central and manifest both before and beyond constraints’ thresholds (unlike 
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consequentialist considerations), it can safely be concluded that her theory really is and 
should be interpreted as a deontological theory. 
Finally, as previously noted, I am sympathetic to the idea that both deontological 
and consequentialist considerations are ones that people do take into account in their 
commonsense ethical thinking. In light of this, there does appear to be a need to explicitly 
address this plurality in our normative theorizing, and one might argue like Smilansky 
does and claim that ‘moderate deontology’ is a misleading way of representing 
commonsense morality, which both masks its pluralist reality and ignores the challenge 
of pluralism facing normative ethics. 
In response, the challenge of pluralism is one that must be answered by 
considering various normative concerns and trying to develop a plausible theory that best 
accommodates those concerns. One could go about answering this challenge in different 
ways. For example, one might develop a consequentialist theory (e.g. a rule-
consequentialism) and thereby attempt to accommodate constraints as rules that prohibit 
certain actions but are chosen on the basis of consequentialist considerations, or one 
could develop a moderate deontological theory and thereby attempt to accommodate 
consequentialist considerations as ones that are secondary to deontological concerns but 
can nevertheless build up to severe degrees and override deontological matters. Thus, 
moderate deontology does not ignore the challenge of pluralism. Rather, it convincingly 
addresses it in such a way that it both retains the centrality of its deontological 
component and simultaneously allows for the relevance of other non-deontological 
considerations. Also, ‘moderate deontology’ signifies the notion that morality is primarily 
deontological but not absolutely so. Accordingly, it is not misleading because it indicates 
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the theory’s commitments and arguably the fundamental commitments of commonsense 
moral thinking. 
Perhaps Smilansky might desire something else, though, from ethical theorists. 
Perhaps what we should be doing is trying to develop a pluralist theory that 
accommodates deontological matters, consequentialist considerations, virtue ethical ones, 
and so on, but does not disguise itself, so to speak, as any one species of normative 
theory. One could certainly go in for such a theory if one were attracted to this idea of 
pluralism and the centrality of various normative concerns, but for theorists who are 
committed to a different notion of morality, that morality has a distinct structure of some 
sort or another and that some kinds of consideration are more prevalent or critical than 
others, it seems reasonable that those theorists should endeavor to construct theories that 
accommodate whatever normative concerns they deem necessary within the frameworks 
of their preferred ethical theories. 
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LOCATING THRESHOLDS FOR DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 
 So much for the first worry about moderate deontology. The second worry to be 
addressed concerns a theoretical difficulty for the positing of thresholds for deontological 
constraints. Anthony Ellis (1992) reasons that there is no non-arbitrary way of setting 
thresholds for constraints due to the fact that deontological and consequentialist concerns 
are incommensurable. Surprisingly, given the prevalence of moderate deontologists, 
Ellis’s contention has not received much attention in the literature, although Samantha 
Brennan (1995) has begun to give an account of how one might reasonably go about 
locating thresholds.23 In what follows I will present Ellis’s argument, suggest a solution 
to the worry he raises, and respond to objections along the way. Also, while I think that 
some of Brennan’s ideas about our commonsense moral intuitions are on the right track, I 
will argue that the moderate deontologist should take a different approach to locating 
thresholds for deontological constraints than Brennan’s.  
Ellis 
 After making some preliminary comments and describing the sort of theory that 
he intends to raise problems for, namely, moderate deontology (he labels it ‘non-
absolutist deontology’), Ellis straightaway gives an example of how the view is supposed 
to work. He has us imagine that terrorists have kidnapped someone (presumably 
innocent) and have threatened to kill the person unless we murder someone else (also 
innocent, I presume). On a moderate deontological view, he observes, it would be 
                                                        
23 Judith Jarvis Thomson (1990) also develops an account of thresholds, but for the sake of 
brevity I will focus my attention on Brennan’s discussion. I believe that much of what I will have 
to say about Brennan’s account would apply equally to Thomson’s anyway since both have 
strong commitments about what can count toward overriding deontological constraints, and I 
think that such commitments are misguided. Furthermore, both accounts are incomplete to the 
extent that they are unable to resolve Ellis’s worry.  
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impermissible for us to kill the one person to prevent the terrorists from killing the other. 
However, the matter becomes quite different if we alter the example to include many 
lives being at risk. Accordingly, Ellis then has us imagine that the terrorists have hijacked 
a plane carrying 400 people and will blow it up unless we kill someone. Now the 
moderate deontologist will probably assert that we are permitted to kill the one to save 
the many. Here is Ellis: 
 Let 'Act 1' mean, in the example, murdering one person to save one; 
Let 'Act 2' mean, in the example, murdering one person to save two; and 
so on to 
 'Act 400', which will mean, in the example, murdering one person to save 400. 
 
Non-absolutist deontologists say that it is wrong to murder unless the 
consequences of refraining would be sufficiently bad. In the example, I am 
imagining that they would agree that Act 1 would be wrong but that somewhere 
along the line from Act 1 to Act 400 it would become right to commit the 
murder.24 
  
What is lacking in moderate deontology, and what must be provided if the theory 
is to be effectively action-guiding or a plausible normative theory at all, is an acceptable 
account of what Ellis calls “the sufficiency condition”.25 The sufficiency condition is the 
condition that must be met for a deontological constraint violation to become permissible. 
It is what is supposed to make sense of the location of a constraint’s threshold, whatever 
the particular location may be. In the context of the example, we need an account of the 
sufficiency condition that will tell us at what point, between Act 1 and Act 400, the 
murder becomes permissible and how this is so.26 According to Ellis, the deontologist 
                                                        
24 Ellis (1992), p. 858. 
 
25 Ibid. p. 859. 
 
26 Larry Alexander (2011) asks, “Is the threshold for killing 2 lives saved, 20 lives saved, 200 
lives saved, or 2,000 lives saved—and why?” (p. 88.). 
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cannot give a satisfactory account of the sufficiency condition because any account she 
gives will be inevitably arbitrary in its specifying of a threshold (or thresholds) for 
constraints, and it will be arbitrary because the two sorts of consideration (viz. 
deontological and consequentialist) are simply incommensurable. There is no way of 
weighing them against each other to determine at what point extreme consequences 
would override deontological matters. 
The reason for the incommensurability is fairly straightforward. As Ellis rightly 
points out, the deontologist believes that the wrongness of violating a constraint is 
intrinsic or non-goal-directed, whereas “the concern with consequences that is supposed 
at some point to generate the rightness of an otherwise wrong action is goal-directed.”27 
In other words, violating a constraint is wrong in itself, independently of any 
consequences of doing so, but consequentialist considerations are instrumental 
considerations, that is, they are considerations that are supposed to affect the normative 
status of actions in view of what those actions would bring about. It is this difference that 
is the source of the incommensurability. 
The Structure of Moderate Deontology 
My argument will proceed in three steps. First, I will describe and defend the 
structure of moderate deontology that we will need to resolve Ellis’s worry. It is not the 
only possible structure for a moderate deontological view, but for reasons that I will soon 
mention, I believe that it is the best structure for the theory to have.  
Moore’s (2010) dam analogy gives us an implausible picture of moderate 
deontology. A dam has an exact threshold at which, when the water rises high enough, 
                                                        
27 Ellis (1992), p. 862, his emphasis. 
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the water reaches the threshold and spills over. If we apply that sort of picture to 
moderate deontology, then we obtain a view that seems committed to saying that there is 
an exact threshold for a deontological constraint at which, when the consequences 
become severe enough, the consequences can reach and surpass that threshold, and they 
will override the constraint. I will call this the ‘tipping point structure’. The implausibility 
of the tipping point structure lies in the fact that it would imply that violating a constraint 
is wrong at any point before the constraint’s threshold, and then suddenly (and very 
mysteriously) it becomes right to violate a constraint whenever the consequences reach a 
certain level of severity, the tipping point. According to this kind of structure, in Ellis’s 
example there is some point between Act 1 and Act 400 at which the consequences 
become severe enough, and the murder suddenly becomes the right thing to do. Act 49 is 
wrong, but Act 50 is right, say. What could possibly explain this shift? I do not think that 
a satisfactory answer could be given to this question, but I also do not think that the 
moderate deontologist has to give one. This is because moderate deontology need not 
have the tipping point structure in the first place. It should be rejected for a more 
reasonable alternative. 
 In order to avoid this kind of problematic shift, the moderate deontologist needs to 
represent constraints’ thresholds differently. Instead of treating thresholds as tipping 
points, I contend that she should treat them as ranges of permissible options. I will call 
this the ‘range structure’. Here is how it would work. Before a threshold is reached, 
deontology rules as absolute, and so respecting any deontological constraint before a 
threshold is obligatory. But, once a threshold is reached, respecting the constraint 
becomes merely permissible, and the same goes for violating the constraint. On the range 
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structure, there will be a range of cases in which either respecting or violating some 
constraint would be permissible. In the example, we might say that any of the acts 
between Act 50 and Act 100 are permissible, but none of them are obligatory because one 
would also be permitted to abstain from performing the murder. And finally, to complete 
the structure, once some set of consequences becomes so severe that a threshold is 
exceeded (e.g. beyond Act 100), violating a constraint would no longer be merely 
permissible, but required, and abstaining would be impermissible. 
 An immediate concern about the range structure is that it may be ad hoc. One 
might wonder why we should accept this structure for moderate deontology since it 
seems that the only reason for positing it in the first place was to avoid the issue of 
problematic shifts in the normative status of actions, which the tipping point structure is 
vulnerable against (and that very issue may still remain with the range structure, but I will 
get to that). We need some justification for the structure besides its being able to explain 
away mysterious shifting. If the range structure has no further explanatory power, then 
we should conclude that it must be ad hoc, or so one might claim.  
 Fortunately, this concern can be removed because there is no ad hocery in 
positing the range structure, as an appeal to commonsense morality will show us.28 
According to commonsense morality, murdering an innocent person, for example, is 
wrong even if it will prevent the murder of a few other innocent persons. Here we are 
considering murdering the innocent before the threshold for the constraint against murder 
                                                        
28 The appeal to commonsense morality is appropriate because, as stated earlier (p. 19.), I take it 
that moderate deontology represents the morality of common sense. Furthermore, that moderate 
deontology does represent commonsense moral thinking is essential to my solution of Ellis’s 
worry, which will become clear as the argument moves forward. 
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has been reached, and as the range structure suggests, one is obligated not to murder.29 So 
far, so good. However, as the number of innocent lives at stake increases, there will come 
a point at which commonsense moral thinking tells us that murdering one innocent 
person to save much more than a few is permissible, but unless the number of innocent 
lives at stake has reached an extreme amount, commonsense morality might also tell us 
that it is permissible still to abstain from murdering the one. This is because intuitively 
there will come a point at which the two kinds of consideration, deontological and 
consequentialist, will seem to be equally weighty, and so we would not blame someone 
for choosing to murder or for choosing to abstain. Either action would be permissible, 
and the range structure is able to make sense of this commonsense intuition since it 
allows for a range of permissible options.  
The notion of a range is especially helpful here because our intuitions will begin 
to get fuzzy within some range, and this fuzziness, I suggest, results from the weightiness 
of the two kinds of consideration beginning to match up, although we have no 
straightforward way of weighing the two against each other. The fact of the matter is that 
commonsense morality does give weight to both deontological and consequentialist 
considerations, but since they are incommensurable, we can only rely on our intuitions 
for guidance with regard to how much weight one has in relation to the other (I will say 
more about this later). Also, it should be noted that this is where the tipping point 
structure fails. Because the tipping point structure does not allow for a range of 
                                                        
29 I am assuming here that the threshold for the constraint against murder is at least high enough 
to prohibit violations of that constraint for the sake of saving a few innocent lives. It is not an 
unwarranted assumption, though, since the moderate deontologist and commonsense moralist (are 
these the same?) will very likely be in agreement about the threshold being located at least this 
high. 
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permissible options, it fails to account for the fuzziness of our intuitions within some 
range. 
Finally, if the number of innocent lives at stake becomes very great, then it is 
probable that our intuition will then be that murdering the one innocent person to save 
very many just is morally required. This is because there will come a point at which our 
intuitions will lose their fuzziness, and this is indicative of the range, which constitutes 
the threshold, coming to an end. At such a point we would no longer say that either 
murdering or abstaining is permissible because too much would be at stake; abstaining 
would be impermissible. The consequentialist considerations would override the 
constraint against murder, and thus, in accordance with the range structure, beyond the 
constraint’s threshold the murder would be obligatory. 
 The range structure for moderate deontology, then, is not ad hoc. Not only does it 
resist the issue of mysterious shifting in the normative status of actions, but it also 
comports with common sense to the extent that it provides a framework for 
understanding commonsense moral intuitions. Still, an objection looms: the range 
structure does not successfully resolve the issue of mysterious shifting. Rather, it merely 
relocates it. This is because the range structure allows for shifting in the normative status 
of actions at the lower and upper boundaries of the threshold. What makes this shifting 
any less mysterious than the shifting that would take place within the tipping point 
structure? 
 This objection should not concern us. What makes it the case that the shifting that 
would occur within the range structure is not mysterious is just the fact that our 
commonsense intuitions would be tracked by it. There is nothing strange or problematic 
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about the kind of shifting that would occur at the lower and upper boundaries of a range 
because this is how moderate deontology is able to explain the gain and loss of fuzziness 
of people’s intuitions. However, there is another way of interpreting the objection that 
may raise some difficulties for the range structure. The fuzziness of our intuitions 
certainly comes in degrees, and so where would the shifting take place? Would it be 
exactly when they begin to become fuzzy at the lower boundary, and exactly when they 
completely lose their fuzziness at the upper boundary, or would it happen some other 
way? To make matters worse, people’s intuitions will probably vary quite significantly 
when it comes to their gaining and losing of fuzziness in different situations, and so how 
could we reasonably go about determining at what point thresholds (qua ranges) begin 
and end for different constraints, given this probability of widespread variation in 
people’s intuitions? 
 I will answer these questions in due course, but first I should discuss how we 
could make sense of the idea that commonsense moral intuitions behave in ways that the 
range structure for moderate deontology is able to track. Specifically, we need some 
explanation for the lack of fuzziness of people’s intuitions both before and beyond 
thresholds, and for the presence of fuzziness within ranges. The explanation will be one 
that Ellis himself criticizes, because he thinks that it does nothing to resolve his worry 
about the locations of thresholds being arbitrary, but I will argue that it is correct and then 
turn to the final step of my solution to Ellis’s worry, which will confront the charge of 
arbitrariness. 
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Degrees of Wrongness 
 Our moral intuitions can lack fuzziness, and they can also become fuzzy 
whenever consequentialist considerations build up enough to begin to offset 
deontological ones, and both the lack of fuzziness and the presence of it can be accounted 
for theoretically by postulating that there are varying degrees of wrongness that 
accompany the violation of different deontological constraints and allowing for the 
occurrences of different sets of consequences. The more stringent the constraint, the more 
wrong it would be to violate it, and the more severe the consequences, the more wrong it 
would be to let them occur.30 This is just to say that some constraints are more serious 
than others, and so, all else being equal, it would be worse to violate the more serious 
ones than it would be to violate the less serious ones, and the same goes, mutatis 
mutandis, for allowing different sets of consequences to occur. Also, by ‘worse’ I just 
mean ‘more wrong’, and thus we have degrees of wrongness. 
 Before turning to how the notion of degrees of wrongness is supported by our 
commonsense intuitions, I should examine how the range structure allows for degrees of 
wrongness. The explanation is quite simple. There is some fixed amount of wrongness of 
violating a given constraint, and this is reflected by the location of the threshold for that 
constraint. But, since different constraints have different degrees of stringency, there are 
different amounts of wrongness of violating constraints that correspond to their different 
degrees of stringency (or their different threshold locations; the higher the threshold, the 
                                                        
30 That different constraints can have different degrees of stringency is tantamount to saying that 
different constraints can have different threshold locations. We encountered this idea earlier in 
Alexander and Moore (Spring 2015 Edition) who discuss “sliding scale threshold deontology” 
and in Samantha Brennan (1995) who discusses “killing a person” versus “punching them in the 
nose” (p. 148.). 
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more stringent the constraint, the more wrong it would be to violate it). Now, regarding 
consequences, the degree of wrongness of letting some set of consequences occur just 
corresponds to how severe the consequences are, but these degrees of wrongness only 
begin wherever a threshold begins (since it is not wrong to allow consequences to occur 
before a threshold is reached), although the consequences build in or have weightiness 
before a threshold is reached. As a set of consequences becomes more severe and 
approaches the threshold for some constraint, the normative weightiness of the constraint 
in question begins to match up with the weightiness of the consequences. Then, once the 
threshold is reached, it would be just as wrong to violate the constraint as it would be to 
let the consequences occur within some range, and once the threshold is exceeded it 
would be more wrong to let the consequences occur by not violating the constraint than it 
would be to violate the constraint and thereby prevent the consequences from occurring. 
 We can see, then, how the range structure allows for varying degrees of 
wrongness in both violating constraints and allowing sets of consequences to occur, and 
how the structure makes sense of the relation between the two kinds of consideration 
when it comes to their counterbalancing each other by having different degrees of 
wrongness at stake of being realized. However, in light of my previous discussion of 
moral wrongness, in which I claimed that it is always in some respect wrong to violate a 
deontological constraint yet it is only wrong to allow a set of bad consequences to occur 
beyond a threshold (p. 14.), one might object that there is an inconsistency between this 
claim and the present characterization of varying degrees of wrongness, but this is not so. 
As a deontological theory, moderate deontology is rightly committed to holding that 
violations of constraints are always intrinsically wrong, even when the intrinsic 
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wrongness is offset by the instrumental goodness of preventing the occurrence of some 
set of severe consequences. In addition, that it is only wrong to allow severe 
consequences to occur at or beyond a threshold is compatible with the claim that 
consequences can build in weightiness until they reach this point without it ever being 
wrong to allow them to occur. In this way, they contrast with deontological concerns. The 
intrinsic nature of the wrongness of violating a constraint is plainly unlike the 
instrumental nature of the wrongness of allowing bad consequences to occur, and for this 
reason the moderate deontologist can coherently treat the wrongness of violating 
constraints differently than the wrongness of allowing for bad consequences. In 
particular, she can maintain with consistency that violating constraints is always 
intrinsically wrong yet allowing bad consequences to occur is only instrumentally wrong 
whenever they meet or exceed a threshold. Furthermore, there is intuitive motivation for 
describing the difference in wrongness this way. An example will help to illustrate this. 
 Suppose that the only way I could prevent the torture of some innocent person 
would be to torture one innocent person myself. From a moderate deontological and 
commonsense point of view, I should not torture the one to prevent the torture of the 
other, all else being equal. So, suppose I do not commit the torture. If the other person is 
tortured because I refused to torture, then I have allowed bad consequences to occur that I 
could have prevented by violating the deontological constraint against torture, but there is 
no instrumental wrongness here for which I am responsible and might be expected to 
make amends for. Rather, there is intrinsic wrongness in the act of torture itself. This is 
where the wrongness lies, not in my allowing it to occur, and if I were to apologize to the 
tortured person, then it would seem that I should be apologizing for what the torturer has 
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done, not for what I have allowed (“I’m sorry he did that to you!” versus “I’m sorry I 
allowed that!”). In contrast, if I tortured one innocent person to prevent the torture of an 
entire city of innocent persons, then although I would have performed the all things 
considered right action by committing the torture, intuitively we think that I should 
apologize or make amends for torturing the one because the person was innocent after all, 
and I used her as a means to an end. In this case, the intrinsic wrongness is overridden but 
not eliminated, whereas in the first case there just is no instrumental wrongness because 
the wrongness is solely intrinsic on the part of the torturer’s actions. And if I failed to 
torture the one innocent person to prevent the torture of the city, then my failing to do so 
would have instrumental wrongness that I would be responsible for. Thus, we can see that 
it is reasonable to treat intrinsic wrongness differently than instrumental wrongness such 
that the former always arises whenever a constraint is violated, but the latter is present 
only if one fails to prevent consequences at or beyond a constraint’s threshold. 
 Concerning the lack and presence of fuzziness in people’s moral intuitions, 
positing degrees of wrongness helps to explain why our intuitions may lack fuzziness 
whenever it would clearly be wrong to violate some constraint (e.g. whenever there are 
no bad consequences to take into consideration) or to allow some set of severe 
consequences to occur (e.g. whenever there are extremely bad consequences that could 
only be prevented by violating some not-very-stringent constraint). In these kinds of 
cases, our intuitions are not fuzzy because the degree of wrongness of violating some 
constraint or of letting some severe consequences occur is apparently high or at least not 
even close to being overridden by any other kind of consideration. On the other hand, our 
intuitions may be fuzzy whenever we are uncertain about whether we should violate a 
  36
constraint or let some consequences happen. In these cases, the degree of wrongness of 
violating some constraint may begin to match up with the degree of wrongness of letting 
some bad consequences occur, and so our intuitions would become fuzzy. 
Invoking Intuitions 
 The first two steps of the solution to Ellis’s worry are complete. I have argued for 
a particular structure for moderate deontology, the range structure, and shown that both 
the range structure and the changing character of our moral intuitions can be adequately 
explained by positing degrees of wrongness. The third and final step will be to give a 
plausible and non-arbitrary account of the “sufficiency condition,” as Ellis calls it, the 
condition that must be met for a deontological constraint violation to become permissible. 
 The account of the sufficiency condition must involve an appeal to people’s 
commonsense moral intuitions in order to resist the charge of arbitrariness. This is 
because Ellis is right that deontological and consequentialist considerations are 
incommensurable, but while it is true that there can be no principled way of weighing 
them against each other, it is also still true that commonsense morality does give 
normative weight to both kinds of consideration, and moderate deontology is supposed to 
be a commonsense theory. So, because commonsense morality does give weight to both 
kinds of concern and moderate deontology is intended to track commonsense intuitions, 
the account need not be arbitrary; there is nothing arbitrary about invoking commonsense 
intuitions for guidance in locating thresholds since these intuitions are exactly what the 
theory is designed to account for. It would of course be arbitrary, in Ellis’s example, to 
just choose some act out of thin air between Act 1 and Act 400 as the point at which the 
murder becomes right, but the moderate deontologist can do better than that. It seems that 
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the only reason Ellis is able to arrive at the conclusion that any account of the sufficiency 
condition will be unavoidably arbitrary is that he seems to assume that the only plausible 
account would have to be one that shows that deontological and consequentialist 
considerations are commensurable on some scale, and there does not appear to be any 
scale available for that purpose. If I am right, though, then we can have a non-arbitrary 
account of the sufficiency condition without having any such scale. All that we will need 
for the account that I will present is a procedure for invoking people’s moral intuitions, 
and this procedure, I will claim, will effectively enable us to locate thresholds for 
deontological constraints. 
 I noted at the beginning of this discussion of the second worry about moderate 
deontology that Samantha Brennan (1995) has begun to develop an account of thresholds 
for constraints (“rights” is her preferred term).31 Since she is one of very few that have 
addressed the subject, before giving my own account of the sufficiency condition, I 
should briefly discuss why I think that Brennan’s approach could not succeed at locating 
thresholds for constraints. 
 The three central features of Brennan’s account are what she calls the “total 
requirement,” the “universal constraint,” and the “existential constraint.” The total 
requirement is “the total amount required to be at stake before you can justifiably infringe 
a right.”32 The universal constraint “dictates a minimum that each and every of those who 
benefit from the right infringement must have at stake, if what they have at stake is to 
                                                        
31 I say that she has “begun” to do so because she writes, “[I]t is my hope to begin to remedy this 
omission in right’s theory with the development of a structure which I believe helps us think more 
clearly about rights and their thresholds” (p. 146, her emphasis.). The omission is one “of a 
worked out account of thresholds” (Ibid.).   
 
32 Ibid. p. 147. 
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count towards the total.”33 And “a plausible version” of the existential constraint “would 
say that there must be at least one person among the beneficiaries who has at least as 
much at stake as the rights bearer.”34 The total requirement is useful because, for any 
given deontological constraint, there must be some total amount of consequences that 
could be at stake that would justify a violation of the constraint, as this is just what the 
moderate deontological position on constraints is (according to Brennan and Thomson, 
all constraints violations are unjustified infringements, but not all infringements are 
unjustified; some, for example, are overridings, but this is merely a terminological 
difference between us). The universal and existential constraints are constraints on what 
consequentialist considerations can count toward the total requirement. These two 
features of Brennan’s account, I believe, are what get her into trouble. 
 First, regarding the universal constraint, why should we think that there is some 
minimum that must be at stake for each person in order for what is at stake for him or her 
to count at all towards the total requirement? Brennan seems to think that the universal 
constraint is just intuitive, that some consequences are just too trivial to count. For 
example, she claims that no number of minor headaches at stake could justify (or even 
count in favor of) a violation of the deontological constraint against murder. You simply 
cannot justifiably murder someone to prevent the occurrence of any number of minor 
headaches. Even if we agree with Brennan on this point, though, it does not follow that 
the headaches do not count in favor of the murder at all. That my murdering someone 
would prevent a million headaches from occurring must be at least some moral reason in 
                                                        
33 Ibid. p. 151, her emphasis. 
 
34 Ibid. p. 153. 
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favor of the murder, even if we grant that it is relatively weak and does not override the 
constraint against murder. To illustrate this point further, consider a case in which 
murdering one person would prevent one hundred other comparable murders and a 
million headaches, and suppose that the threshold for the constraint against murder is 
such that only fifty innocent lives need be at stake to justify a violation of the constraint 
against murder. What, in this case, counts in favor of murdering the one? Of course it is 
not just fifty lives being at stake because one hundred lives are actually at stake, but 
should the million headaches not count too? I think that our response should be that the 
headaches do count in favor of the murder, even though they probably would not count as 
enough all on their own to justify the murder, and this is because the fact that one could 
prevent a million headaches by performing any given action would count as a moral 
reason in favor of that action, whether or not it decisively requires the performance of the 
action. 
 Secondly, regarding the existential constraint, things only get worse for Brennan’s 
account. On Brennan’s preferred version of the existential constraint, “‘as much or more’ 
must be at stake for at least one beneficiary [as there is at stake for the rights bearer].”35 
For instance, if one million people’s thumbs would be removed unless I removed one 
person’s arm (and add the assumption that it is worse to lose an arm than it is to lose a 
thumb), then if Brennan is right, I could not permissibly remove the one person’s arm 
because no single beneficiary of the arm removal would have as much as or more at stake 
than the person who would lose his or her arm. If, given this implication, you are not 
already inclined to reject the existential constraint, then consider some even more 
                                                        
35 Ibid. p. 154. 
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problematic results. Suppose that, in the example, Brennan’s universal constraint would 
be met by having a thumb at stake. If this were true, then the one million thumbs being at 
stake would count in favor of removing the one person’s arm, but unless at least one 
person’s arm were added to what is at stake, the one million thumbs would effectively 
count for nothing because the existential constraint would not be met, and minimally both 
the universal and existential constraint must be met to satisfy the total requirement. That 
is to say, unless an arm being at stake is added to the consequentialist considerations, the 
million thumbs will make no moral difference, but once the arm is added in and the 
existential constraint is thereby met, then suddenly the million thumbs can make a 
difference because each thumb being at stake would meet Brennan’s universal constraint 
and thus count toward the total requirement for removing the one person’s arm. Or 
suppose that each of the million thumbs being at stake did not satisfy Brennan’s universal 
constraint. Then, we get the dubious result that the million thumbs being at stake would 
not count in favor of removing the one person’s arm whatsoever, with or without the 
inclusion of at least one person’s arm being at stake.       
 Brennan’s account must ultimately fail at locating thresholds for deontological 
constraints not only because of the implausible constraints on consequentialist 
considerations (especially when they are considered together), but also because it does 
not even begin to address Ellis’s worry, especially as it is presented in his example (at 
what point between Act 1 and Act 400 does the murder become right?). I should point out 
that Brennan does not intend to answer Ellis with her discussion, but this is beside the 
point. The universal and existential constraints are too strong and cannot successfully 
capture our commonsense moral intuitions. Thus, if the moderate deontologist hopes to 
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both capture commonsense intuitions and resolve Ellis’s worry, then she will need to take 
a different approach to locating thresholds than Brennan’s. 
 As Ellis puts it, the sufficiency condition is “the condition that allows that an 
action which is, at least normally, intrinsically wrong will be right given that its 
consequences would be sufficiently good.”36 I will have to rephrase the sufficiency 
condition because Ellis assumes a tipping point structure for moderate deontology to 
which his sufficiency condition would apply, but I have already concluded that the range 
structure is a more reasonable structure for the theory since it more accurately accounts 
for our intuitions and their tendency to gain and lose fuzziness. There will be two 
sufficiency conditions for the range structure, one for the lower boundary and one for the 
upper boundary of a threshold. At the lower boundary, there will be a condition that must 
be satisfied for a constraint violation to become merely permissible; call it the 
‘permissibility condition’. And at the upper boundary, there will be a condition that must 
be satisfied for a constraint violation to become obligatory; call it the ‘obligatoriness 
condition’. If the moderate deontologist gives an acceptable account of these two 
conditions, then she gives an acceptable procedure for locating thresholds for 
deontological constraints, and Ellis’s worry is no more. 
So, how could the moderate deontologist give a plausible account of these two 
conditions? One might think that the best way to go about it would be to simply examine 
people’s considered moral judgments and develop an account of the two conditions on 
that basis, but certainly there will be a variety of judgments about, for example, at what 
point between Act 1 and Act 400 the murder becomes merely permissible and at what 
                                                        
36 Ellis (1992), p. 859. 
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point it becomes obligatory. Notwithstanding this difficulty, I believe that examining 
people’s considered moral judgments must be the correct way to locate thresholds for 
constraints. This is because moderate deontology is supposed to give structure to our 
commonsense moral judgments, which are informed by our intuitions about specific 
cases. Whatever our considered judgments about when it is permissible and when it is 
obligatory to violate particular deontological constraints are, these judgments, I maintain, 
are what signify the locations of thresholds.37 When is it merely permissible to violate 
some constraint? That is, what is the permissibility condition for that constraint? When is 
it obligatory to violate some constraint? That is, what is the obligatoriness condition for 
that constraint? Answer: whatever our considered moral judgments are in cases in which 
the constraint and some consequentialist considerations are in play, those are what 
indicate when the constraint can be permissibly violated and when one is required to 
violate the constraint. The intuitions that inform these judgments, after all, are the very 
content of morality! They are a reflection of what the group values, and the best way to 
conceptualize what the group values is to observe and give structure to their considered 
moral judgments.  
The solution to Ellis’s worry, then, is democratic in nature. The group gets to 
decide what matters to them, what they value, and there will have to be group agreement 
about the locations of thresholds, or at least some kind of averaging of the group’s 
judgments. The permissibility condition will be met whenever people’s moral intuitions, 
                                                        
37 Let me be clear about what I am claiming. I am claiming that people’s considered moral 
judgments are what should indicate to the moderate deontologist the locations of thresholds for 
deontological constraints because those judgments are informed by the moral intuitions of the 
group, which are what determine the locations of thresholds since moderate deontology is 
supposed to track people’s intuitions.    
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on average, become fuzzy, as this indicates the point at which people are uncertain about 
what the right thing to do is since they value (to different extents) both deontological and 
consequentialist considerations, and these are beginning to match up according to their 
best intuitive judgments. The same goes for the obligatoriness condition, which is met 
whenever people’s intuitions, on average, lose their fuzziness, and it becomes clear that 
the right thing to do is to prevent the occurrence of some bad consequences. This allows 
us to answer one of the questions posed earlier. At what point does the shifting of the 
normative status of violating some constraint happen, given that the fuzziness of people’s 
intuitions will come in degrees? According to our democratic solution, the shift just 
happens whenever the group, on average, is comfortable with saying that it happens. 
Again, this is a reflection of what the group values, and the content of morality is 
supplied by the values of the group, which are implicit in their intuitive judgments. 
 How large is the group? Is it an entire nation, a small community, or everyone in 
the world? What counts as commonsense moral thinking in one culture may be quite 
different than what counts in another. Given this fact, I submit that the democratic 
solution should be applied to different cultures in order to determine what the locations of 
thresholds for deontological constraints are within the context of each culture.38 Different 
cultures will value deontological and consequentialist considerations to different extents, 
                                                        
38 It is essential to my characterization of moderate deontology that constraints’ thresholds are 
high, and one may worry that postulating this kind of cultural relativity when it comes to locating 
thresholds could result in there being low thresholds. In response, while I believe that moral 
intuitions about the significant weightiness of deontological constraints in relation to 
consequentialist considerations are quite consistent across cultures (such that people from 
different cultural backgrounds consistently agree on constraints being much weightier than 
consequences), I have no empirical evidence on hand to support this claim. Unfortunately I 
cannot give a full treatment of the issue here, so I will set it aside. A complete account of the 
democratic solution will have to address this concern, though, and I plan to do just that in future 
work.     
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and although it is widely believed to be a tenet of commonsense morality that one is not 
permitted to violate a deontological constraint unless very much is at stake, some groups 
may give more or less weight to constraints than others do. Can one group be closer to 
the moral truth than another, depending on the weight those groups give to each kind of 
normative consideration? I doubt it because I doubt that when it comes to morality, there 
is one set of correct judgments regarding what one ought to do in situations involving 
thresholds, and so no one culture will have all the right judgments since whether a given 
judgment about what one ought to do in a situation involving a threshold is correct will 
depend on the values of the group, which the person making the judgment is a part of. 
 While I have no detailed methodology for how we could gather information about 
people’s considered moral judgments, I do have an explanation for why we should think 
that such information would give the moderate deontologist what she requires for an 
account of the permissibility and obligatoriness conditions. Such information, if it were 
carefully and thoroughly gathered, would provide the moderate deontologist with the data 
that she would need to precisely locate the point at which violations of particular 
constraints become merely permissible, in accordance with the group’s average intuitive 
judgment, and the point at which violations become obligatory, again in accordance with 
the group’s average judgment. A complete procedure for gathering this kind of 
information would include, among other things, inventing a variety of hypothetical 
scenarios for people to consider that would elicit their intuitions about the ratio of 
weightiness of deontological to consequentialist considerations in an assortment of cases. 
Of course there are numerous different kinds of deontological and consequentialist 
  45
concerns that would have to be addressed, but this is hardly an objection to attempting to 
uncover people’s intuitions about what matters.  
 Now for some objections to this approach. First of all, why should we care about 
what people’s considered moral judgments are? Is it not true that people could just be 
getting it wrong whenever they judge that it is merely permissible or obligatory to violate 
some constraint? With respect to the reliability of people’s intuitions, Alexander (2008) 
writes, “[E]ven if almost everyone’s intuition ran in favor of [moderate deontology] and a 
[threshold number] of 56, I would require some deeper explanation for why that intuition 
should be thought determinative.”39 But, I ask, what further explanation could we give 
and why think that one is necessary? In the first place, moderate deontology, as I have 
repeatedly pointed out, is a supposed to be a commonsense moral theory, and so to ask 
for some deeper explanation of the contents of people’s commonsense moral intuitions is 
simply to ask for something that should be of no concern to the moderate deontologist 
since her theory is meant only to systematize people’s intuitions; she just takes the 
intuitions for granted. Whether or not people’s intuitions are a reliable guide to moral 
truth is an entirely different matter that I cannot even begin to tackle here, but suffice it to 
say that we should at least consider it prima facie reasonable that people’s intuitions 
about what matters and the ratio of weightiness of deontological to consequentialist 
considerations are a reliable guide to locating thresholds for deontological constraints, 
especially since those intuitions are what moderate deontology is intended to capture. 
 A related objection, due to Ellis, is that locating thresholds cannot (or should not) 
be based on group agreement “for the simple reason that it has to be possible for the 
                                                        
39 Alexander (2008), p. 102, note 15. 
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agent to assess the morality of the group to which he belongs—and at the deepest 
level.”40 Nothing in what I have said, though, would imply that agents could not 
undertake an assessment of the group’s considered moral judgments or the intuitions that 
would inform those judgments. What the democratic solution implies, and plausibly so, is 
that the locations of thresholds are open to revision. This is because people’s moral 
intuitions may very well change over time, or at least they may be reconsidered, as 
people become more informed and reflect more deeply about their moral convictions and 
engage in moral discourse with others, and this will undoubtedly affect how the group 
values and weighs different kinds of normative consideration. 
 Ellis also goes on to assert the following: “Suppose that everyone did in fact 
agree, on the number 50 say, but no-one could give any reason why it should be 50 and 
not some other number. This would not tell us anything about moral theory; it would 
simply be an utterly bizarre mystery.”41 He is right, I think, to declare that it would be 
mysterious if everyone agreed on some exact number, but he cannot be right that such 
agreement would tell us nothing about moral theory. Indeed, it would tell us a great deal! 
In particular, if everyone agreed in this way, then it would tell us that people’s moral 
intuitions are such that they all agree on the normative weight of deontological and 
consequentialist considerations, and if everyone similarly valued these two kinds of 
consideration, then we would have the necessary data to locate thresholds. 
 The last and most challenging (and, perhaps, most obvious) objection to the 
solution of Ellis’s worry is that there will almost certainly be vast disagreement about 
                                                        
40 Ellis (1992), p. 870. 
 
41 Ibid. Ellis’s emphasis. 
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when it is merely permissible and when it is obligatory to violate constraints in order to 
prevent bad consequences. At one extreme, some people may have very strong 
deontological intuitions to the extent that they deny that violating a constraint is ever 
merely permissible. At the other, some people may have very strong consequentialist 
intuitions to the extent that they believe that constraints violations are always obligatory 
whenever doing so would have better consequences than not doing so. Fortunately I do 
not think that we have to worry about these characters, not because they are rare, but 
because they would have intuitions that are contrary to common sense. Commonsense 
morality, after all, prohibits violating constraints for the sake of preventing trivially bad 
(or ensuring trivially good) consequences, and it permits constraints violations whenever 
those violations are necessary to prevent severe consequences. Since moderate 
deontology is a commonsense moral theory, it is concerned with giving structure to our 
commonsense intuitions, not those of absolutists or act-consequentialists. While there 
might still be widespread disagreement among commonsense moralists, I doubt that the 
disagreement could be nearly as dramatic as the one with absolutists or act-
consequentialists, and for this reason we should be confident that our democratic solution 
could adequately account for people’s commonsense intuitions and help us to 
successfully locate thresholds for deontological constraints.  
 
 
 
 
 
  48
APPLYING MODERATE DEONTOLOGY 
 The third worry about moderate deontology is that the positing of thresholds for 
deontological constraints would have counterintuitive implications whenever the theory 
is applied to certain kinds of cases. This worry, then, takes for granted that thresholds can 
be successfully located in order to draw our attention to a few other challenges for 
moderate deontology. I will examine three cases that involve these challenges, which are 
due to Larry Alexander (2000), and argue that they can be answered by the moderate 
deontologist.   
Alexander 
 Alexander considers a number of different applications of moderate deontology to 
specific cases, which invite some difficult questions for the moderate deontologist. I will 
start by presenting the applications and Alexander’s comments about each one. While he 
focuses on thresholds for both deontological constraints and affirmative duties (e.g. a 
duty to rescue), I will choose to focus on the examples involving constraints since much 
of the discussion in this thesis has been about thresholds for constraints. Also, because 
the applications take for granted, for the sake of argument, that there are precise 
thresholds for deontological constraints, Alexander assumes in his examples that the 
threshold for the constraint against torturing an innocent person is such that at least 100 
lives must be at stake for torturing an innocent person to be permissible. 
 Here is Alexander’s first application of moderate deontology: 
A terrorist has captured and hidden 100 hostages in a number of locations. At 
each location he has planted a bomb that will automatically detonate at noon. The 
terrorist reveals this to the police and demands certain concessions from the 
government before noon; otherwise, he will allow the bombs to kill the hostages. 
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Luckily, the police have grabbed the terrorist’s mother, who is in no way 
implicated in her son’s terrorism. If they torture her, however, they believe that 
the terrorist will relent. And because 100 lives are at stake, the mother’s right not 
to be tortured is overridden. So they begin torturing her on live television. Sure 
enough, after some severe suffering by his mother, the terrorist calls the police 
asking them to relent. The police ask him for the location of the hostages and the 
bombs, and he tells them where one, and only one, hostage and bomb are located. 
Because only 99 hostages now remain at risk, the police can no longer torture the 
terrorist’s mother.42 
 
According to Alexander, two troubling implications follow from this sort of case. The 
first is that the stopping of the torture suggests that the lives of the rest of the hostages are 
mere counterweights that serve no moral purpose other than to count toward overriding 
the constraint against torture so that at least one person’s life could be saved. Drawing on 
Moore’s dam analogy, Alexander asserts that the rest of the hostages are like water below 
a dam’s threshold. They only serve to boost others above the threshold so that others can 
be saved. 
 Secondly, what Alexander thinks this sort of case (i.e. a case in which the 
threshold is barely met) reveals is that the constraint against torture could actually be 
overridden for the sake of saving just one innocent life. This is because as soon as the 
police become aware of the location of one of the hostages and are then able to save him, 
they can no longer torture the terrorist’s innocent mother since the constraint’s threshold 
is no longer met. But, per Alexander’s stipulation, one cannot be permissibly tortured for 
the sake of saving only one innocent life, and so it seems that cases like this one are 
paradoxical. 
 Here is Alexander’s second application of the theory: 
Suppose this time that the terrorist has hidden only one bomb and ninety-nine 
hostages. Because Ntorture/lives is 100, the police are stymied. However, they do 
                                                        
42 Alexander (2000), pp. 900-901. 
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know approximately where the bomb and hostages are located, and they can, 
through some deception, lure a handicapped man in a wheelchair into that area. 
Presently, he is far enough from the bomb to escape death, though there is some 
risk that he will be injured when it explodes. If lured close to the bomb, he will be 
unable to wheel himself out quickly enough to escape death from the noon blast. 
The police proceed to lure him into harm’s way, at which point they begin 
torturing the terrorist’s mother, with the result that the terrorist reveals the 
location of the bomb and hostages.43 
 
In this case, Alexander is careful to observe, although it may seem that the handicapped 
man has been wronged (presumably by having his right not to be lured into harm’s way 
violated), it actually turns out that the man’s welfare was quite possibly increased. This is 
because had he not been lured, he would have been open to the risk of injury whenever 
the bomb exploded, but since he was lured close enough to the bomb, the police were 
permitted to torture the terrorist’s mother and consequently gain the necessary 
information to prevent the bomb from exploding (or at least get everyone out of harm’s 
way). 
 Alexander also points out that if the handicapped man had been asked by the 
police to wheel himself closer to the proximate location of the bomb, then he might have 
very well done so with the expectation that the torture would begin and everyone would 
ultimately be saved. However, as Alexander correctly asserts, the moderate deontologist 
should deny that there can be voluntarily created thresholds for deontological constraints. 
If many people were to voluntarily put themselves in harm’s way, for example, moderate 
deontology should not allow (much less require) in such a case that a torture be carried 
out that would rescue those people. It follows that the police could not have permissibly 
tortured the terrorist’s mother had they asked the handicapped man to wheel himself 
closer to the bomb, and absent any other way of rescuing the hostages, the police could 
                                                        
43 Ibid. p. 902. 
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only permissibly torture the terrorist’s mother by first luring the handicapped man closer 
to the bomb. 
 Here is the third application: 
Again, Terrorist has hidden a bomb and 100 hostages, and Ntorture/lives = 100. This 
time, the police have captured Terrorist’s innocent brother and sister. Because 
they are unsure whether Terrorist will break if only one of his siblings is tortured, 
they torture both until Terrorist reveals the location of the bomb and hostages. 
 
By hypothesis, the police have acted immorally. One person may be tortured to 
save 100, but not two. But are they guilty of violating the rights of both, or only 
one, of the siblings? If the latter, whose?44 
 
In addition to posing these difficult questions regarding whose rights were violated, 
Alexander contends that in this sort of case the conduct of the police causes great harm 
(since it causes two innocent people to be tortured), but the immorality of their conduct 
causes much less harm (since only one innocent person is impermissibly tortured). The 
reason for this, according to Alexander, is that moderate deontology treats the terrorist’s 
innocent brother and sister as expendable resources since the threshold for the constraint 
against torture has been reached, and so one of them can be permissibly tortured, but not 
both. 
Response to First Application 
 Recall that Alexander thinks that there are two problematic implications that 
follow from the first kind of case in which the police are forced to stop the torture of the 
terrorist’s innocent mother since the threshold is no longer met. The moderate 
deontologist can resist the first implication, that ending the torture suggests that the rest 
of the hostages are treated as mere moral counterweight, by simply denying it and 
pointing out that nothing in her theory commits her to this view of moral agents. That the 
                                                        
44 Ibid. p. 904, Alexander’s emphasis. 
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hostages are treated as moral counterweight may be accurate, but that they are treated as 
mere moral counterweight is not. This is because moderate deontology can retain typical 
deontological presumptions about persons, such as that persons are ends-in-themselves 
and are to be respected and have equal moral status, and at the same time hold that 
persons may sometimes have to be counted as moral weight whenever a deontological 
constraint is in play and is being considered against consequentialist considerations that 
include the lives of persons being at risk. So, while it is true that persons may sometimes 
be treated as moral weight, it does not follow from this that persons must be treated 
merely as moral weight in these situations. It is not as if moral agents suddenly lose their 
intrinsic worth whenever they are included in some set of consequentialist concerns. 
They just acquire the property of having moral weight in addition to the other features 
that deontologists usually ascribe to persons, and none of those features are incompatible 
with the property of having moral weight when included in consequentialist 
considerations. In fact, it seems that the very reason that moral agents have moral weight 
in situations involving thresholds is that they have these aforementioned morally relevant 
features that deontologists attribute to them. 
Furthermore, Alexander’s use of Moore’s dam analogy is flawed. The lives of the 
hostages are not comparable to water below a dam’s threshold. Dam water has a certain 
spatial location, and so water below a dam’s threshold does serve to boost water located 
above it over a dam’s threshold. Only water that is elevated high enough to go over a 
dam’s threshold will go over it, though. In Alexander’s example, and in general, none of 
the lives at stake occupy any spatial location in relation to the constraint’s threshold. The 
terrorist does inform the police of the location of one of the hostages, but it could have 
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been any one of them. Out of the 100 hostages, the rescued hostage just happened to be 
the one that the terrorist let go. He was not located above the other hostages such that 
only he could be rescued in virtue of his being above the threshold. 
 Regarding the second implication, that the case is paradoxical because the police 
are permitted to torture in order to save 100 hostages but have to stop the torture after 
saving only one hostage since the threshold is no longer met, the moderate deontologist 
can resolve this by stating that the torture should not be stopped. This is not a case in 
which the constraint against torture is overridden for the sake of saving one hostage. 
What justified the torture in the first place was the fact that there were 100 innocent lives 
at stake and those lives could be saved by performing the torture, and thus if the police 
were to stop the torture after saving only one person, then they would be acting 
impermissibly. Suppose that the torture did go on after the terrorist revealed the 
whereabouts of just one hostage. If the terrorist continued to disclose information to the 
police until all 100 hostages were saved, then the torture would have been justified 
because it would have prevented the deaths of 100 innocent lives. Stopping the torture at 
any point before all of the hostages are no longer at risk would be impermissible, and to 
claim that the police must stop after one hostage is saved is to claim that the police must 
do something impermissible. Even though there are no longer 100 lives at stake after one 
hostage is saved, the torture is still justified because it is an ongoing process that will 
save all 100 lives. 
 Although it is true that only 99 lives are at stake once the first hostage is saved 
and 99 lives being at stake would not justify a torture, the 99 lives at risk are not what 
justifies the torture as it continues on. The torture is justified from start to finish by the 
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fact that it is necessary to save the 100 hostages. When there is only one hostage left to be 
saved, the police have to continue with the torture because it is the end result that 100 
lives will be saved by the torture that makes it the case that the torture is permissible 
throughout.  
 We could also suppose that the terrorist decided that he would stop disclosing 
information to the police after revealing the whereabouts of, say, fifty hostages, and 
consequently the rest of the hostages could not be saved. This would imply that the 
torture was never permissible in the first place since it would not have resulted in the 100 
hostages being saved. Not even the first hostage could be saved in this sort of case 
because, per Alexander’s assumption, the torture could only be permissibly carried out if 
it would save all 100 hostages.             
Response to Second Application 
 By luring the handicapped man into the area in which the bomb was located, the 
police did become able to permissibly torture the terrorist’s mother, but the luring itself 
was impermissible, or so I will argue. I will not argue directly for this conclusion, but 
rather I will do so by considering two arguments for the position that the luring was 
permissible and concluding that both of those arguments fail. That luring the handicapped 
man was impermissible will come out of the discussion of the two arguments. 
 First, one might reason that the luring was permissible because a deontological 
constraint against luring people into harm’s way was overridden by severe 
consequentialist considerations. The minimal degree of severity of consequences that 
would justify a violation of the constraint against luring people into harm’s way, one 
might contend, is lower than the minimal degree of severity of consequences that would 
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justify a violation of the constraint against torture. So, since the constraint against luring 
people into harm’s way is less stringent than the constraint against torture, luring the 
handicapped man closer to the bomb was permissible, as it was justified by the fact that 
the luring ultimately resulted in 100 lives (including the man’s life) being saved from 
certain death. If torturing the terrorist’s mother was permissible because performing the 
torture resulted in 100 lives being saved, then surely luring the handicapped man into the 
area in which the bomb was located was permissible for the same reason. 
 This argument fails to establish that the luring was permissible. In the first place, 
it inaccurately describes the consequentialist considerations in favor of the luring. The 
luring did not result in 100 lives being saved, but it did result in 99 lives being saved and 
one handicapped man avoiding probable injury. This is because, prior to the luring, only 
99 lives were at risk of death and one handicapped man was at risk of probable injury, 
and if the luring had not occurred, then 99 people would have died and the man would 
have likely been injured.  
We will grant for the sake of argument, though, that luring someone into harm’s 
way is justified if it is the only way to prevent the deaths of 99 people and the probable 
injury of one person, all else being equal. Now, we can point out a different issue. The 
moral reasons in play were not just the foregoing that counted in favor of the luring. 
There was also a consideration that counted against the luring, namely, the fact that it 
involved using a person to allow for a torture. The police lured the handicapped man into 
harm’s way so as to bring about the consequence that they could permissibly torture the 
terrorist’s mother, and they tortured the terrorist’s mother so as to bring about the 
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consequence that the 99 hostages and handicapped man would be saved.45 Although it is 
true that if we ignore fact that the handicapped man was used to justify the torture, then 
we might conclude that the luring was justified by the fact that it saved 99 lives and one 
person from probable injury, we cannot simply ignore his being used. The handicapped 
man was clearly used as a means to a torture, and in this case it was wrong to use 
someone as a means to permissibly using someone else. That is to say, in this case it was 
wrong to violate a deontological constraint as a means to permissibly violating another 
deontological constraint. Even though the latter violation was permissible because it 
prevented the occurrence of severe consequences, this does not entail that the first 
violation was permissible, and the first violation cannot be justified solely by appeal to 
some set of consequences that count in favor of its violation if those consequences could 
only be brought about by a separate constraint violation that was just barely warranted.46 
 Another argument for the position that the luring was permissible might appeal to 
the fact that the handicapped man was already in danger of serious injury, and so on the 
assumption that a luring is permissible if it results in the lured person escaping risk of 
                                                        
45 It should be noted that the morally relevant consequence of the torture is different than the 
morally relevant consequences of the luring, and the morally relevant consequences of each could 
be determined by considering the relevant counterfactuals. If the torture had not occurred, then 
the 100 people near the bomb would have died, so the consequence of the torture is that 100 
people were saved. If the luring had not occurred, then the 99 people near the bomb would have 
died and the handicapped man would have probably been injured, so the consequences of the 
luring are that 99 people were saved and the handicapped man avoided probable injury.    
 
46 The moderate deontologist should be willing to allow that some constraints violations may be 
permissible whenever they allow for other constraints violations, which are required in order to 
prevent very severe consequences. In Alexander’s example, luring the handicapped man would 
have been permissible if there were one million lives at stake, say, and this is because one million 
lives at stake would justify the two constraints violations required to save those lives. In the 
original example, though, Alexander stipulates that a torture is permissible only if it is the only 
way to save at least 100 lives, and so violating the constraint against luring someone into harm’s 
way and violating the constraint against torture could not both be justified by 100 lives being at 
stake since this is the minimum that must be at stake to justify a torture on its own.  
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injury, luring him was permissible because by luring him he escaped the risk of injury. 
He was of course lured into an area in which a bomb was located and would have killed 
him if it had exploded, but he was not lured into harm’s way because the police were 
certain that the terrorist would relent if the terrorist’s mother were tortured. Thus, luring 
the handicapped man was justified since it prevented a risk of serious injury to him, or so 
one might claim. 
 This argument is similar to the first one in that it attempts to justify the luring by 
appeal to the consequences of doing so, but it is different because it restates the constraint 
against luring someone, making it less stringent by specifying that it is luring someone, 
but not into harm’s way. It also restates the consequences that justify the luring. We will 
grant for the sake of argument that since the constraint against luring someone, but not 
into harm’s way, is less stringent than the constraint against luring someone into harm’s 
way, violating the former constraint may be justified by an appeal to less severe 
consequences (e.g. a risk of serious injury) than the minimally severe ones that would 
justify a violation of the constraint against luring someone into harm’s way. Thus, we 
will grant that if luring the handicapped man had been the only way to prevent the risk of 
serious injury to him, then, all else being equal, the luring would have been permissible. 
Like the first argument, the “all else being equal” phrase causes problems for this 
second argument. The luring may have been the only way to prevent the risk of injury to 
the man, but while the fact that the luring would prevent the risk of injury to him was a 
moral reason that counted in favor of the luring, that moral reason only existed because of 
the fact that the police would be able to permissibly torture the terrorist’s mother once the 
handicapped man was close enough to the location of the bomb. The moral reason that 
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counted against the luring was the fact that a handicapped man would be used to justify a 
torture. So, the luring certainly prevented the risk of injury, but only because it allowed 
for a torture that kept the terrorist from detonating the bomb and thereby killing the 
handicapped man, which invites a further question about the argument’s restating of the 
constraint against luring. Was the man lured into harm’s way or not? I submit that he was 
lured into harm’s way because even if the police were certain that the torture of the 
terrorist’s mother would compel the terrorist to relent, the torture was what prevented the 
death of the handicapped man, and so he must have been in harm’s way, which is what 
constituted part of the severe consequences that justified the torture. And because the 
man was lured into harm’s way, one cannot justify the luring by appealing to the fact that 
he avoided the risk of serious injury since ‘harm’s way’ here just means a risk of death, 
which could only be avoided by a separate constraint violation. That is to say, one cannot 
justify luring the man by stating that he was lured away from a risk of injury when the 
luring was one that put him at risk of death.  
Response to Third Application 
 Alexander makes clear in the example that the police were uncertain about 
whether or not the terrorist would relent if only one of his siblings were tortured, and for 
this reason they tortured both his brother and sister. Let us suppose, first, that torturing 
only one of his siblings would have been insufficient, and so the police had to torture 
both of them to save the 100 hostages. In this case, the police have acted immorally 
because they have impermissibly violated the deontological constraint against torture 
twice over. Neither violation was permissible on its own because neither would have 
compelled the terrorist to relent, and although the conjunction of the constraint violations 
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was necessary to save the hostages, given Alexander’s assumption that 100 lives must be 
at stake to justify one torture, the two violations were impermissible. 
Now, we will suppose that torturing only one of the terrorist’s siblings would have 
been sufficient to compel the terrorist to relent, and if this is the case, then the result that 
the 100 hostages were saved was overdetermined by torturing both of the siblings. This 
case invites Alexander’s question of whose rights were impermissibly violated because 
one of the tortures must have been permissible on the assumptions that it was enough to 
compel the terrorist to relent all on its own, and the threshold had been met to justify one 
torture. Two constraint violations occurred, but only one was permissible, so which one? 
 The question arises for Alexander because of the way that he characterizes the 
moral harm done. As he presents the case, there was an impermissible rights violation, 
and discussion of rights often assumes a certain way of understanding moral harm, 
namely, moral harm as a kind of personal harm. On this account, there is a problem of 
locating the moral harm in cases of overdetermination such as the one we are presently 
considering, and this is because either the terrorist’s brother or his sister’s right not to be 
tortured was impermissibly violated, but whether it was the brother or sister who had his 
or her right impermissibly violated is indeterminate. One cannot, without arbitrariness, 
pick out the brother or sister’s right not to be tortured as the one that was impermissibly 
violated. 
 Fortunately the moderate deontologist can sidestep Alexander’s question by 
relying on a different account of moral harm. Throughout this thesis, I have continually 
spoke of deontological constraints, not rights or duties, and this was to avoid committing 
myself to an agent or patient-centered deontological view that might assume a certain 
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account of moral harm. My suggestion, now, is that the moderate deontologist should 
characterize the moral harm of violating deontological constraints as a kind of impersonal 
harm. In Alexander’s example, then, the police are guilty of an impersonal harm that was 
brought about by impermissibly violating one deontological constraint.47 They are not 
guilty of a personal harm that was brought about by impermissibly violating someone’s 
(whose?) right not to be tortured. So, there is no puzzle about whether the right of the 
brother or sister was impermissibly violated since the moral harm done was impersonal 
and thus would not be attached to either of the terrorist’s two siblings. Of course, as 
Alexander points out, the police are responsible for physically harming both the brother 
and sister, and these harms are correctly understood as personal harms, but they are guilty 
of only one moral harm, and that harm is an impersonal one that consisted in the 
impermissible violation of the deontological constraint against torture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
47 We could even maintain that they are responsible for the impersonal harms brought about by 
violating two deontological constraints, although one of the two harms was justified by the severe 
consequentialist considerations. Therefore, they are culpable because one of the impersonal 
harms was unwarranted. 
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